

2013/08/22 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000700130003-0 ID BOTTOM

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR

This is for information only.

**Attached is the released testimony of
Governor Rockefeller given in executive
session before the Jackson Subcommittee on
1 July 1960.**

STAT


**John S. Warner
Legislative Counsel**


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
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From the Office of
• Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.)
Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on
National Policy Machinery
Capitol 4-3121, Ext. 3481

For Release: A.M.'s
Monday, July 11, 1960



NOTE TO PRESS
(from Senator Henry M. Jackson)



Attached is the transcript of executive session testimony by the Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller, Governor of the State of New York, who appeared before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery on July 1, 1960.

Because this testimony related to the National Security Council, it was taken in executive session in accordance with the "guidelines" agreed to by the Subcommittee Chairman, Senator Jackson, and President Eisenhower last July. Those guidelines state that: "Any testimony by present or former government officials who have served on the National Security Council or its subordinate bodies regarding the National Security Council and its subordinate machinery will be taken first in executive session."

This testimony has been cleared for release in accordance with the procedures set forth in the guidelines.

ORGANIZING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Witness: The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller,
Governor of the State of New York

Friday, July 1, 1960

United States Senate
Subcommittee on National
Policy Machinery of the
Government Operations
Committee
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met in executive session, pursuant to notice, at 1:00 p.m., in Room 3302, New Senate Office Building, Senator Henry M. Jackson, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Senators Jackson and Muskie.

Also present: J. K. Mansfield, Staff Director; Robert W. Tufts, Chief Consultant; Dorothy Fosdick, Grenville Garside, Howard E. Haugerud, Brewster C. Denny, Richard S. Page, Professional Staff Members; Edmund E. Pendleton, Jr., Minority Counsel; Charles A. Haskins, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council.

Senator Jackson. The subcommittee will resume its sitting. In accordance with the announcement made earlier by the Chair, all statements by Governor Rockefeller relating to the National Security Council or its subordinate agencies will be heard first in executive session.

First of all, Governor, you do not have a prepared statement on this phase of the study?

Governor Rockefeller. No, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Jackson. Some witnesses have indicated to us that the NSC has tried to do too much in the sense of involving itself with too many policy questions, some of not too great importance. They would like the NSC to concentrate on a smaller number of important policy questions rather than dealing with a large number. What is your general idea on that? In other words, how should this important advisory body be best utilized?

Would you preface your answer by stating for the record your association with the NSC and its subordinate agencies?

Governor Rockefeller. I attended the meetings for a year in 1955 when I was working for the President as Special Assistant. I attended all the Security Council meetings. I attended many of the Planning Board meetings and had a representative who sat in on those in my office and was Vice Chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board.

They set up a planning coordination group, but I don't think it has ever been announced.

Senator Jackson. This transcript initially will be classified and will then be cleared by the White House for release.

Governor Rockefeller. Good. So they will delete anything they want.

Senator Jackson. Whatever involves security. You will have an opportunity to take anything out you may wish.

Governor Rockefeller. I appreciate it.

Senator Jackson. We have allowed this with all witnesses. We want to avoid getting into anything of a substantive nature as it went on in the NSC.

Governor Rockefeller. Then I was Chairman of a planning coordination group which was established when I came to the White House. The purpose of this was to try to develop a more imaginative, creative approach to the carrying out of NSC policy.

The Operations Coordinating Board is a coordination of operations, just as it says.

Senator Jackson. It is set up to follow through on NSC decisions.

Governor Rockefeller. Yes. They felt, this was prior to my arrival, and I think it was the director of the Bureau of the Budget who happened to be a sponsor of this, that there was a need for a more imaginative pursuit of these objectives as stated in NSC papers than developed by the departments, particularly from the psychological point of view. Therefore, this body was set up with representation from State, Defense and CIA. It had certain secret assignments but it also had this broad assignment. However, this was bitterly resented by State, because they felt it was an invasion of their authority and responsibility and the result was the lack of cooperation from that area made it impossible of effective functioning after about six or eight months. You could just go against a wall of opposition so far and then it is useless. So I recommended the abandonment of the operation. But it was an evidence of the fact that there was a feeling that there was need for more creative and imaginative thinking.

I think this is the kind of thing that this First Secretary could put into this. I made some recommendations about the Operations Coordinating Board which were carried out subsequently, namely, that the President's representative be Chairman and not the Under Secretary of State; that it have a staff of its own and not a borrowed staff from the departments which was rotated, and that it be given authority other than advisory. It is advisory now. That was not carried out.

Going back to your question, I would say it has two phases. One is the structural question and the other is the substantive question. Structurally the Planning Board is so constituted that it is like these other committees we were discussing. A major question is presented to the Planning Board and the various parties at interest, namely, the Departments, each with its own role in relation to the area under discussion, work pretty carefully with highly skilled representatives to get language into the position paper which while it does not

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violate the objective, protects their own position and their own special -- I don't say interest -- responsibility in this field.

So you get a watered down version before it comes to the NSC and language which permits considerably more freedom than would appear on a superficial reading of the document.

Senator Jackson. There is a tendency to compromise?

Governor Rockefeller. To compromise and also to get permissive language which is not too obvious in the phraseology. This is quite an art, this business.

Senator Jackson. You feel, I take it, that what should occur is that these matters should be presented to the NSC from the Planning Board with sharp alternatives, so that you can encourage debate and discussion.

Governor Rockefeller. Yes. If you have a man who is of the stature and has the staff to support him of the kind that I was suggesting, and who has the responsibility for this mechanism and these other mechanisms, he, then, can, through that staff, prevent the development of a paper that is so watered down by simply taking more of a responsibility in the development of the paper, or as you suggest, Senator, presenting alternatives. If he presents those alternatives rather than a department, they are going to carry more weight. So when the President comes into the meeting, and this paper is there, he will have been briefed by the First Secretary and will know the background, and also the alternatives and the strength of the paper in my opinion will be lifted very importantly, because he can make some decisions in the process of developing this material which today nobody has the authority to make.

Senator Jackson. What you are saying, at least as I interpret it, is that the NSC should not encourage debate for debate's sake, but, where there are some critical problems, the various points of view should be presented so that the President can exercise his Constitutional responsibility and make the decision. I gather you feel that there is a tendency sometimes in this whole departmental process to save the President work, which certainly is helpful where problems are not highly important and where they really should not be passed onto the President. But there is a vital area, namely, the area relating to National Security which is a Constitutional responsibility of the President, and problems in this area should be presented to him in such a way that he can see the clearcut alternatives and then make the decision.

Governor Rockefeller. Exactly.

Senator Jackson. You share that philosophy?

Governor Rockefeller. I feel very strongly that way. I think the public does not recognize the degree to which the Planning Board really does 95 percent of the work, and it is not very often that a paper is changed by the Security Council. So the real work is done in the Planning Board on these position papers and very few items are taken up without a paper and very few papers are substantially changed.

Senator Jackson. Did you get the general impression when you were there that the tendency was to reach agreement and compromise in the Planning Board so all the Departmental interests would be taken care of, rather than to develop papers with sharp alternatives so there would be an encouragement of debate and discussion and so on?

Governor Rockefeller. I think that almost is the necessity under the structure which they have and under the system which they have.

Senator Jackson. You feel that the thing that generates this result in part at least is the way the Planning Board is set up?

Governor Rockefeller. Yes, because there is nobody with authority to make a decision when there are differences of opinion. Therefore, to get a paper, it can only be by compromise. I think there needs to be a strong Presidential leadership at that level, which is the Planning Board level.

Senator Jackson. We have had quite a bit of testimony suggesting that the Secretary of State should be in a position of primacy in this area, the orchestra leader dealing with all of the elements that go into national security. What do you think of that suggestion as an alternative to your concept of the First Secretary?

Governor Rockefeller. We discussed that and explored that very fully, because that is almost the obvious solution as distinct from this other one.

Senator Jackson. The point is that someone must bring all these elements in the national security area together.

Governor Rockefeller. That is right.

Senator Jackson. It is a question of whether the Secretary of State leads, or the First Secretary.

Governor Rockefeller. If you could go back to the original concept of Secretary of State, when that office was set up, where he had the national seal and so forth, he was in a sense in this position. However, if you now elevate him to a position of super-cabinet responsibility, which this involves, because he has to be able to make decisions between Departments, you then have a cabinet officer with a Constitutional responsibility delegated by the Congress in his function, arbitrating in a dispute between himself and another department. So he is sitting over himself in a sense, making decisions. It is a pretty tough thing to have the party at interest in a discussion finally say, "All right, I decide I am right," rather than a third party representing the President directly who is not responsible for these immediate operations, on behalf of the President exercising that. That is one of the reasons.

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Another reason is that if this man is elevated -- that is the Secretary of State -- to the concept that we are talking here, then it would put such an additional load on him that he would not be able to negotiate with his counterparts, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and would be largely precluded from going to those conferences, and then you would have to have somebody, either a Deputy Secretary of State -- and I think the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of other countries would feel they were being slighted if the Secretary of State himself did not come. So you run into a very serious time factor on this.

We had thought of setting up a Department of Foreign Affairs in the Department of State. You could organize the Department of State with a Department of Foreign Affairs, a Department of Economic Affairs and a Department of Informational Affairs. But it would be very hard to establish the authority and prestige of that Department internationally, because the Secretary of State is the man they want to see and talk to. We felt it was easier in the long run from both of these points of view to create a new office which in a sense goes back to some of the original concepts that this nation had in establishing the Secretary of State as against a Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

Senator Jackson. I gather that the thing that runs through your mind is that if the job in the national security field is to be properly coordinated, the one who is doing it must in fact be above other cabinet officials because he will be calling on them and in a sense directing them to do certain things that are essential and necessary to bring about this overall policy on national security involving, as it does, military, economic, political, and psychological factors and so on.

Governor Rockefeller. Exactly right.

Senator Jackson. So you would either be calling the Secretary of State the Super-Secretary and make it so in fact and in law, or you would actually create a new position. You feel there is no avoiding the elevation of this official who must coordinate this job.

Governor Rockefeller. That is right.

Senator Jackson. I think you made a very clear analysis.

Governor Rockefeller. The administrative responsibilities are so great in the State Department already that to add all of these others seems almost insuperable. You have to delegate. At some point the fellow has to be above the administrative responsibility, which this man would be.

Senator Jackson. One thing that troubles me about your proposal is whether you would be able to get a good strong Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense if you have this singular Super-Secretary position right in the White House.

Governor Rockefeller. In my opinion it would facilitate the function of both the other two posts. I have been Assistant Secretary of State and had a great deal of contact with the military department through OCB and through the reorganizations and so forth. As a matter of fact, at one time I agreed to become Deputy Secretary of Defense. So I am pretty familiar with their problems. I think this man would give them someone with whom they could discuss their problems and with whom they could sit down, who is more available than the President is, so that they could get these things straightened out at the Presidential level without having to go to the President on a basis which is impossible from his point of view, timewise. I don't think it would downgrade them. They might think prestige-wise at first, but their functions and responsibilities are so tremendous they don't need additional prestige. What they need is decisions and time and authority to carry them out. This man could give it to them.

I know this is also true in the domestic field. For instance, as Under Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, when Mrs. Hobby was Secretary, we would come on the questions of policy of federal aid to education and these important problems. We wanted to sit down and talk with somebody in the White House as to what national policy was on this. There was not anybody there who was responsible for that except the Bureau of the Budget. Of course, their enthusiasm is less than complete for any program which was going to involve more money.

There is very important need for cabinet officers and their deputies to have somebody to whom they can go in the White House to get policy guidance and who will participate with them in the planning and thinking for the future in other than money terms.

Senator Muskie. Really this is a Super-Cabinet that you are thinking about.

Governor Rockefeller. President Hoover was perfectly right in the two suggestions he made, except it raises so many sort of tabus there because of the concept of the Vice President being an elected official.

Senator Jackson. You get into Constitutional problems.

Governor Rockefeller. Yes. I don't think you can put somebody in the domestic scene who has authority over a cabinet officer because these things are too hot in terms of domestic political life. I don't mean partisan political but whether it was water or economics and so forth. There could be a man who could serve the President in this area far more effectively than he is now serviced, even though he has I don't know how many dozen special assistants in these different areas.

Senator Jackson. To get back to the question I asked, I had the impression in World War II that Mr. Hopkins' role caused some friction with Hull.

Governor Rockefeller. No question.

Senator Jackson. During the latter years of Mr. Hull's occupancy of the position of Secretary of State I had the impression that he was quite unhappy about Mr. Hopkins' role. This leads me to the question whether an Acheson or a Dulles would accept a First Secretary over them.

Governor Rockefeller. I talked about this position to Secretary Dulles on various occasions. In fact, I worked with him on the development of this concept. He was completely for this. He visualized himself in that position.

Senator Jackson. You made the answer very easy.

Governor Rockefeller. That is right. I don't think you have to worry as long as the position is there before the people take the other posts. The only difficulty would be this super-imposition over existing personalities. I think it is so needed and so recognized by all that there would not be real difficulty. This will facilitate the work of everybody.

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Senator Jackson. I want to go back a moment to the Planning Board and the process of developing papers. Unless the principals discuss the paper in depth in the NSC and discuss alternative courses of action, will they really understand what the policy is?

Governor Rockefeller. That is fair.

Senator Jackson. In other words, by getting the kind of situation developed where you have hard alternatives, and you have the debate and discussion, isn't this the way you really come up with a final Presidential decision where everyone will understand fully the policy. But when you attempt to compromise and m@ld it in with everything it is something of everything and no one really knows what it really means. They all interpret it individually from their own parochial point of view.

Governor Rockefeller. I think that is a very fair statement. But in order to have a really intelligent discussion on the kind of question which comes before the National Security Council, in my opinion there has got to be some additional material available. I feel, as I mentioned in the open discussion, the need for what I call a position room. So when you are going to discuss problems in Africa relating to these new nations becoming independent, I would like to see these Security Council meetings held in a position room and on the walls would be the pertinent economic factors, a map showing which countries are being discussed, which country has come out from colonial status to independence, when, what their economic problems are, what the political structures are. I think you have to have certain background information for many of the members of the Council who are not familiar with these questions. They need to have really a factual briefing by the briefing officer of the pertinent information so that they can bring that to bear on the subject of discussion in the paper.

Senator Jackson. As a matter of fact, the way it works out practically, the statutory participants in the NSC are heavily burdened with their own operating responsibilities.

Governor Rockefeller. That is right. They don't have time to brief themselves. General Marshall used this system a great deal. I thought he did a superb job in understanding the collateral factors which related to the decision in question and having that factual information available and interpreted before the decision was made, and visual presentations I think are very useful.

Senator Jackson. Senator Muskie.

Senator Muskie. I have just a couple of questions. I don't know how many times I have said that and then found a whole string of questions following.

With respect to the Planning Board, did you find in your experience that there was a tendency for disagreements within a department to be smothered?

Governor Rockefeller. Yes, before they got there.

Senator Muskie. Before they got to this position that you are speaking of.

Governor Rockefeller. There is no question. That is natural. Again if the First Secretary and his staff are functioning properly, and he controls the mechanism of these various interdepartmental agencies related to the National Security Council, he would be aware of that kind of situation, and would see that it got the opportunity of reflection.

Senator Muskie. With respect to OCB, it strikes me that this agency ought to perform three functions: One, that of liaison in the process of implementing policy; secondly, to review the effectiveness of the implementation; thirdly, to judge the effectiveness of the implementation.

In this connection the OCB should have the power or authority to bring to the attention of the NSC and the President the failure to implement adequately. Would you agree with that?

Governor Rockefeller. I agree completely with what you are saying. I saw that first hand for a period of a year. There is no question about the wisdom of it. I think the structure as it exists of these committees--I was just looking to get my paper on the number of those---this review work which you are referring to is done by these committees which are largely chaired by members of the State Department. It is very hard for someone, no matter how honest and empirical he tries to be, to review the work of his own department and to say that it has been a partial failure or an utter failure, and to call it to the attention of the Security Council. There are 36 OCB working groups, and these are the groups which are reviewing these programs and appraising them. They are almost exclusively chaired by State Department personnel. I think this is one of the weaknesses. I don't blame State for wanting to have their own people as chairmen of these committees, because they are a very delicate area. But it does make it difficult -- not criticizing individuals, it is just natural. I worked very hard trying to get reviews that were independent and to get them back to the NSC. But in so doing I ran into feeling on the part of State that here I was interfering and they would go to the President and complain. That man is causing trouble. He is just raising havoc with an orderly effective procedure.

I think you put your finger right on the thing. We have to get fast appraisals, honest appraisals, and have the courage to admit something is not working, the policy was not right, the program was not right, and revise it.

This goes back to your first question, Senator Jackson, and that is as to the amount of material that comes before the Security Council. I think myself that too much time is spent on position papers that go for a year and everything is frozen for a year. There needs to be much more flexibility with planning in depth, not just on a calendar basis, that leads to a constant review and somebody who can bring up when things look as though they were going to get hot can bring such a question up off the calendar. The calendar is frozen months ahead.

Senator Jackson. There should be more flexibility so that the Council can concentrate on critical issues and not have a paper on every country in the world and have it come up constantly on an automatic calendar system.

Governor Rockefeller. No. You can't get the paper reviewed unless you get it on the calendar and you can't get it on the calendar because the events don't happen that way.

Senator Jackson. The people planning the NSC calendar don't have the exact information as to what the enemy is doing to alter the calendar.

Governor Rockefeller. That is right. This would be a function of the First Secretary and he would be in a position to do it.

Senator Muskie. I think the First Secretary with his finger right on the pulse could direct functions of OCB a little more effectively in this respect.

Governor Rockefeller. And the Planning Board, and leading up to the Security Council.

Senator Muskie. I think it is a challenging idea.

Governor Rockefeller. It really is.

Senator Muskie. I don't have any more questions. I would enjoy going on indefinitely.

Senator Jackson. I just have one or two. Some of the people that we have talked to said that the NSC process should be tied in more closely with the budgetary process. In other words, NSC comes to certain policy conclusions and then there is a problem of whether they will really be implemented or will run afoul of the Budget process. Do you have any comments on bringing the two processes more closely together?

Governor Rockefeller. This is where I think the Office of Executive Management is terribly important. That we do both of these functions, because then you will have a man who is over the budget and who is in a position with the planning group and various other groups working under him to sit down and talk with the First Secretary and see that these things are done, so you don't get a purely monetary domination and thwarting of the execution of policy that is agreed to.

Senator Jackson. Because if an NSC decision, as approved by the President, is to have meaning and to be effective, it requires a budgetary implementation.

Governor Rockefeller. Absolutely.

Senator Jackson. That is why I am raising the question. You feel that the Office of Executive Management might be in a position to do that.

Governor Rockefeller. Yes. The head of that office should be able to work with the First Secretary in seeing to it that these things flow. In other words, he is the operating man who carries out these programs to see that they don't get bogged down or blocked. He has the responsibility that is one step higher than the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

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Senator Jackson. We, of course, as members of this committee, are alert to the relationship of the President and the Congress in the National Security area. Many of the things you have mentioned, and that we have discussed in our hearings can be handled by executive order. Some require legislation. What do you think is the most helpful thing that we as a committee could do? For example, would you think it in order for us to suggest first, recommendations as to the use of existing instrumentalities that are available to the President and as to what the Office of President might have available and what he, the President, might do by executive order? Then, secondly, we might work on statutory changes which the President would need in order to give meaning to certain reforms. Would you think this is a sensible approach?

Governor Rockefeller. Yes, I do.

Senator Jackson. What we are trying to do is to talk to people like yourself and others that are qualified, and who have had experience in the government at various levels right on up to the highest level of the Executive Branch. We want to come up with sensible objective, scholarly, nonpartisan recommendations after the election, so that the new President will have available to him at least some views that other thoughtful people have expressed and try them out if he likes. I just wondered if you had any comments as to what you think our role should be.

Governor Rockefeller. This is where there is need for intimate working between the Executive and the Legislative, because neither can function here without the other. In view of the timetable which you suggest as your thought here, I would think that recommendations from the Administration, if the Reorganization Act were extended, would facilitate passage of programs that you are talking about, because it can combine both legislative and administrative action in a plan which you can review and goes through your committee, which seems to me is the logical place because it has the breadth of understanding and concern. Therefore, I would hope myself, as I said in the prepared statement, that the Reorganization Act could be extended and that there could be discussions with the President or his representatives as to whether he would, under those circumstances, consider making recommendations. I see no reason why they should not be discussed informally prior to the making of the recommendations, to come before your committee, and would already reflect the thinking of both sides in an informal way.

Senator Jackson. It would be helpful, too, if the committee gave him the benefit of the committee's thinking on matters that could well divide themselves into better utilization of existing machinery, and then statutory changes.

Governor Rockefeller. He is in a unique position in the fact that he is going out of office. So whatever he may suggest is not for personal gain or aggrandizement or anything else. This is an unusual time. The new man coming in, of course, his authority will be very strong, newly elected and so forth, and his concurrence should be important. Just the way that President Hoover was effective in recommending plans, if your group working informally with the President developed some ideas which he might recommend.

Senator Jackson. Mr. Pendleton, our Minority Counsel.

Mr. Pendleton. Governor, two conflicting allegations about the operation of the NSC structure have appeared from time to time in the press. One has been that which has been discussed here, the compromise of issues before they reach the final level. The other is the overcrowded agenda. Obviously both can't be true. Do you have any thought?

Governor Rockefeller. I think both are true. I think on the items that come before there has been too much compromise, and I think there are too many items coming before the group. So the agenda was, at least when I was there-- I can't speak with authority today--too long. You had to wait in line to get on the agenda. The plans were a compromise which in some cases--I won't try to make an estimate of the percentage--which I think did not reflect the best interest of our nation.

Mr. Pendleton. Taking the first one first, the question of over-crowded agenda, could you solve that by bringing less problems to the NSC level?

Governor Rockefeller. Yes, I think you can. If there is a person who has the President's authority delegated by the President to make decisions, I think it would be unnecessary to bring some of these matters before the NSC. I think they could be settled the way you would in any operation. There is a conflict, there is a difference of opinion, a hearing is held, points of view are discussed, and the decision is made. I don't think they need to come before the National Security Council. Some of them are much too complicated to be able to have an intelligent decision made by people who are not familiar with the background in a half hour discussion. These things need to have staff work leading up--staffed by the person who has the authority--to his making a decision.

Mr. Pendleton. But the way the NSC operates now as I understand it, it is consultative to the President. It puts before him decisions to make.

Governor Rockefeller. That is the concept. In actual practice the Planning Board makes the decision in the paper, and it is very seldom that paper is substantially modified.

Mr. Pendleton. On that question, the idea of the compromise at the Planning Board level, both Dr. Cutler and Gordon Gray, who participated in that Planning Board operation, have indicated in testimony before this committee---

Senator Jackson. Not Mr. Gray. Mr. Cutler did. Mr. Gray has not been a witness.

Mr. Pendleton. That is right. Excuse me on that. Mr. Cutler said this: "In my experience divergencies of views appeared in over two thirds of the papers before the NSC."

Mr. Gray said, "In fact, more than half the policy statements which are sent to the Council from the Planning Board contain split views largely on important issues on which one or more of the NSC agencies have indicated a strong divergence of opinion" This is from his article prepared for delivery at the 1959 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association and reprinted in our "Selected Materials." I take it you disagree with their opinions?

Governor Rockefeller. No, I don't agree that there were split views in papers that came before. I would not know the percentage. Bobby Cutler was responsible for the operation. He was Special Assistant for Security Affairs when I was there. But the fact that there is a split view on one question or two questions does not mean that there were not widely divergent views on a dozen more questions which were not reflected. You just could not bring these things up in the number of differences that exist. I personally would rather see those decided by someone with authority and who is informed and who is close to the President and had his confidence rather than see them compromised by representatives from ten or a half dozen departments who by the very act of compromise have got to reach a lower common denominator.

Mr. Pendleton. In order that they be brought to the President for decision.

Governor Rockefeller. Yes. You just can't have all this stuff coming before the President. He hasn't got the time.

Mr. Pendleton. That is the basic issue involved, how much of this you want to bring to the President for decision.

Governor Rockefeller. Yes. If he does not have the time, then do you have someone who has his authority to make a decision, or do you let a committee compromise the issue?

Mr. Pendleton. I can see the two points of view and certainly the idea you have is very direct and one approach to it.

Governor Rockefeller. This gets down to the question of whether you give authority to individuals to make decisions or whether you let groups compromise, in the last analysis, and I don't think myself that we can substantially improve the system without some form of higher authority who can really speak for the President with his responsibility.

Mr. Pendleton. You don't think under an approach like that that you would have the charge that the President is being shielded from major issues?

Governor Rockefeller. No, because if you have an Executive Assistant who is working with you and he has your confidence, he can give you very quickly, when you are working together, as they would be, intimately -- and I see in not security matters but just state operating matters -- a man whom I trust, for instance, the Secretary to the Governor, works on policy and operating problems and the department heads see him and he will come to me. I can get from him in a matter of five or ten minutes the essence of the problem. I know him. I trust his judgment. I know his background. We have worked together for years. So I know when he says something, I get the feel of the thing and I can make that decision very fast if he feels that he should ask me about it. Or he will inform me of decisions he has made. I just have not the time to hear these people. If a department feels very strongly that they have been short-changed on a decision and it was wrong they will come to me and I will listen to them. But he is a fair minded man and they have confidence in him. That I think is the kind of relationship which is true in any big operation. There needs to be a delegation of responsibility.

Mr. Pendleton. Thank you.

Senator Jackson. What it really gets down to is that the NSC being an advisory body should concentrate on the highly critical issues so that the President can be exposed to them and make the decisions. These other matters that are of lesser importance involving differences and so on, should not get into the machinery so as to reach the Presidential level.

Governor Rockefeller. Via that route. They might reach it through a five minute talk with his First Secretary.

Senator Jackson. I gathered from the analogy you used that his First Secretary would give him a daily briefing or as need arose.

Governor Rockefeller. That is right.

Senator Jackson. The First Secretary would brief him on decisions he has made and what they relate to, so that the President would be currently informed of what is going on. This gets down to the people you have confidence and trust in.

Governor Rockefeller. Exactly. In the last analysis you can't get around that. The President would then have more time to put into creative thinking, into planning ahead and seeing and visualizing these emerging forces and how we are going to develop policy and programs to deal with those and shape them. Then we are taking the initiative not only at home in our mechanism, but in the world scene, which I think is of tremendous importance. That we not be dealing with other people's man-made crises but that we shaping our own forces.

Senator Jackson. Mr. Khrushchev has time to run around and go various places and still the machinery keeps moving. Not that we are trying to emulate their system, but we do have to look at our competitor and what he is able to do.

Governor Rockefeller. Yes. We have to make those decisions and know that all of the pertinent factors will be brought to bear on the decision by somebody.

Senator Muskie. Do you suppose Khrushchev has an opportunity to consider sharp alternatives?

Senator Jackson. There appear to be some alternatives from time to time, and the main one is survival.

Governor Rockefeller. That is right. You know if we have a clear sense of purpose, then things that happen have meaning in relation to our purpose. If we don't have a clear sense of purpose, then something happens and you don't know how to judge it, because you have no reference to judge it. I think this is one of the key factors in this thing, if you notice where you are going. I use a very simple analogy of two people coming into a room. One is going out the other door and somebody shoves a chair around him. He has no problem. He just pushes it out of the way. The one who has no plan, does not know what to do, walks around the chair and the chair becomes a problem to him. It is

simple but it does have some bearing. With clear purpose with more time to devote to that, a lot of these problems we will know how to handle which now sort of assume staggering proportions because we don't have any basis for judging them.

Senator Jackson. Governor, I can only repeat what I said in the open session. We are terribly grateful to you for your constructive recommendations and suggestions. You have given us over four hours. We are sorry to trespass on your lunch time. I am sorry you cannot join us for lunch.

Governor Rockefeller. I appreciate very much the opportunity of being here. It is a privilege for me. This is a whole field that we are all deeply interested in. To have a chance to discuss it with informed and concerned people is a great pleasure. I have enjoyed it and I would like to express again my respect for what you gentlemen are doing.

Senator Jackson. Thank you. If you have no objection we will undoubtedly be in touch with you later, maybe informally, to discuss some of these matters when we get around to the recommendations that we want to make.

Governor Rockefeller. If I can be of any help, it will be a pleasure. I am trying to do the same thing in the state. Not since Al Smith have they had a reorganization. Bill Ronan, who was Dean of the School of Government Administration at NYU and I have made a complete study and plan and got through 23 bills this year.

(Thereupon at 1:45 p.m., the executive session was concluded.)